We all like to believe that, as unique individuals, we’re
masters of our own destiny and originals in our own right. We may still cling
to this privilege in the U.S.,
but Austrians have officially lost the dispensation, at least with regard to
their likelihood to marry and bear children.
Caroline Berghammer of the Vienna Institute of Demography,
through analysis of the 2008-2009 Austrian Generations and Gender Survey,
charted family life paths and individual likelihood of choosing them, based on
personal religiosity, family size growing up, and other factors. (Because Austria’s
religious population is mostly Catholic, Berghammer only includes Catholics in
her “religious” category.)
This chart lays out the most common “family life paths” in Austria,
among the men and women included in the study who were between the ages of 40
and 45. The numbers represent how many children a person has, and the colors
indicate a person’s relationship status.
Relaxing a little the age rigidity of these life-paths, she
found that the largest proportion of the Austrian population (19.1%) chooses
never to have children and to live in one cohabiting relationship after another
(she calls this “sequential cohabitation”). The smallest proportion (6%)
chooses traditional parenthood—direct marriage, no cohabitation—with three or
more children.
Berghammer found that those who attend Mass monthly or
weekly are more likely to marry directly, without cohabiting, and to have at
least two children. She also found that a person’s odds of cohabiting
sequentially (versus his likelihood to follow the most common life path—cohabiting,
eventually marrying and having two kids along the way) are halved if they
attend religious services.
Those who don’t claim any religion are 87% more likely than
Roman Catholics to have children outside of marriage. Additionally, for every
sibling a person has, he or she is 29% more likely to choose traditional
parenthood and to have three or more children rather than the aforementioned “most
common life path.”
Notably, people who consider themselves religious but don’t
regularly attend church don’t seem to differ much from those who don’t consider
themselves religious.
Figures and chart: Caroline Berghammer, “Family life
trajectories and religiosity in Austria,” August 2010 draft version- later published in the European Sociological Review (2010).
Despite critiques of the U.N.’s world population
predictions, a recent Wall
Street Journal article by Jonathan Last could have gone even further in
pointing out how bleak the developed world’s demographic picture is.
This past May, the U.N. released its latest report on world
demographics, saying that Italy,
Poland, and the
European continent as a whole, have rosy demographic futures. Mr. Last correctly
takes issue with these predictions, saying that in order for the world to
actually achieve the U.N.’s projected numbers, one big assumption had to be
made: That “starting tomorrow, every country in the world with fertility below
the replacement rate of 2.1 will increase its fertility. And this rise will
continue unabated, year after year, until every First World
country has a Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
near replacement.”
Mr. Last reasons that this projection is dubious, in part because
the U.N.’s model was based on data taken from a small group of mostly Scandinavian
countries that have “recovered (sort of)” from sub-replacement fertility. Last
highlights Sweden, saying that its story is a complicated one, “involving
pro-natalist policies, culture and not a little luck”—but somehow, the U.N.
assumes that all low-fertility, industrialized countries from Russia to Italy
to South Korea will follow this pattern.
While Last does highlight the dubious nature of the U.N.’s
projections, he has not gone far enough in emphasizing exactly how incorrect they
are. His suspicion was correct that other countries will not necessarily follow
Scandinavia’s supposed trend. Though it (reportedly) experienced
positive fertility results, even if Sweden’s
success were based on culture and policies, these are not universal. However, the
fact of the matter is that any projection made based off the “success” of these
countries will be incorrect.
Focusing on Sweden,
the story of their fertility rates must differentiate between the fertility of
nationals and the fertility of foreigners (immigrants). According to the Vienna Institute of
Demographics, from 1986-2008, the increase in the total fertility rate of Sweden’s
nationals went from 1.76 to 1.85, a difference that is statistically
insignificant, and is actually because the ‘dip’ to 1.76 in 1986 was a TFR underestimate!
The total fertility rate of foreigners ranged from 2.24 (1986) to 2.55 (2008)—a
range that is above both the replacement level, as well as the level of Swedish
nationals. Any increase in Swedish fertility levels must be understood with
this division in mind, with the result that Sweden
would not experience population increases of its young for any reason other
than immigration. This casts the U.N.’s model into question, as immigration is
not a true account for the increase in a country’s fertility. Furthermore,
immigration depends strongly on (relative) economic factors, something that
varies between countries and is difficult to predict.
Additionally, we all know that Rome
was not built in a day—it takes around 20 years before our newborns are ready
to enter society as adults, and cultures change about as quickly. Why then
should the U.N. anticipate that Italy,
Poland, Japan
or any country would change
overnight? There is no reason to suspect that we will see a drastic positive change
in the fertility habits of individuals (and, thus, nations) any time soon. On
the contrary, anti-natal trends are alive and well in the West when cultures
are spawning
no-kids-allowed movements: Malaysia airlines banned babies from many of
their first-class cabins; McDain’s Restaurant, in Pennsylvania no
longer allows children under 6 to dine; Double Windsor bar in New York bans
babies after 5 p.m.; a Central Florida homeowners association is considering a
ban on children from playing outside, and the
examples continue. All of this is
strong indication that the trend we’re seeing, and one modeled by more
serious demographers than those at the U.N., is here to stay.
We are still slouching into a demographic crisis, and Mr. Last
is right to highlight
economic concerns that will spin off from low fertility rates.
